Abstract.-The individuality of species provides the basis for linking practical taxonomy with evolutionary and ecological theory. An individual is here de ned as a collection of parts (lower-level entities) that are mutually connected. Different types of species individual exist, based on different types of connection between organisms. An interbreeding species is a group of organisms connected by the potential to share common descendants, whereas a genealogical species is integrated by the sharing of common ancestors. Such species de nitions serve to set the limits of species at a moment of time and these slices connect through time to form time-extended lineages. This perspective on the nature of individuality has implications that con ict with traditional views of species and lineages: (1) Several types of connections among organisms may serve to individuate species in parallel (species pluralism); (2) each kind of species corresponds to a distinct kind of lineage; (3) although lineage branching is the most obvious criterion to break lineages into diachronic species, it cannot be justi ed simply by reference to species individuality; (4) species (like other individuals) have fuzzy boundaries; (5) if we wish to retain a species rank, we should focus on either the mostor least-inclusive individual in a nested series; (6) not all organisms will be in any species; and (7) named species taxa are best interpreted as hypotheses of real species. Although species individuality requires signi cant changes to systematic practice and challenges some preconceptions we may have about the ontology of species, it provides the only sound basis for asserting that species exist independently of human perception. [Individuation; metaspecies; phylogenetic systematics; phylogenetic taxonomy; pluralism.]
The term species has historically been important in two more or less dissociated contexts. For taxonomists and users of classi cations, species taxa are the fundamental units for organizing knowledge of biodiversity. For theoretical ecologists and evolutionary biologists, species play the role of the fundamental currency for the communication of ideas (Paterson, 1985) . However, while the pragmatic and theoretical demands placed on the species concept are distinct, they would both be served if the species occupying classi cations were real entities whose existence did not depend upon human perception. In such a case, species assignments would be stable, as demanded by utilitarian concerns, and would have explanatory power, as demanded by theoretical concerns. Such an outcome would enhance the importance of systematics and would permit improved information ow between various branches of organismic biology (Frost and Kluge, 1994; Baum and Shaw, 1995) .
To move towards the goal of having species be real, we need, rst, to achieve a clear conception of what it means to assert that entities such as species exist independently of human perception. Second, we need to develop at least one species de nition that is compatible with the notion of independent existence. Finally, we need to develop epistemological tools with which we could discover such species. This paper focuses on species ontology, namely, the rst two of these three objectives.
I follow much philosophical precedent by approaching independent existence in terms of individuality. I provide a precise criterion of individuality and then offer two species de nitions that satisfy this criterion. Using these de nitions as a basis, I describe a framework for thinking about the temporal existence of species and lineages, highlighting the points of disagreement with traditional opinions on the nature of species. I conclude with a brief exploration of the implications of species individuality for systematic practice.
SPECIES AND INDIVIDUALITY
It is now more than 30 years since the species-as-individuals thesis was proposed (Ghiselin, 1966 (Ghiselin, , 1974 . This thesis holds that species are individuals analogous to particular organisms, chairs, countries, etc., rather than classes of organisms sharing a common property. Equating species with individuals allows them to be seen as self-delimiting and to have some degree of existence that does not depend upon human perception (Ghiselin, 1974 (Ghiselin, , 1987 (Ghiselin, , 1997 Grif ths, 1974; Hull 1976 Hull , 1978 Holsinger, 1984; Sober, 1984) .
That the species-as-individuals thesis has been a major in uence in the debate over the nature of species is evidenced by its prominence in the recent anthology on the subject (Ereshefsky, 1992a) . Nonetheless, the impact of this thesis might have been even greater if not for the continuing imprecision as to the de nition of individuality (Grantham, 1993) . In general, the concept of an individual is described ostensively by referring to familiar, paradigmatic individuals such as chairs and people. However, if we wish to make progress towards understanding individuality, we cannot depend solely upon arguments by analogy (Kitts, 1983; de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988) . Instead, we need to identify one or more properties that are necessary and suf cient for membership in the class of individuals. Mishler and Brandon (1987) took a step in the right direction by identifying four properties of individuals: spatial boundedness (having edges), temporal boundedness (having beginnings and ends), integration (having interactions among the parts), and cohesion (experiencing a uni ed response to a perturbation). They suggested that individuals tend to have these four properties but that none is absolutely necessary for individual status. However, although it was valuable to clarify these properties, the fact that no one criterion is necessary and sufcient for individuality causes dif culties when some, but not all, of the criteria apply. Along similar lines, Ghiselin (1997) listed six key properties of individuals: not having instances, being spatiotemporally restricted, being concrete, not functioning in laws, lacking de ning properties, and being ontologically autonomous. By concrete Ghiselin (1997) means, I think, that individuals can act upon the outside world and can be acted upon (see also Ereshefsky, 1992b ).
While there is nothing wrong with this, or with Ghiselin's other criteria, they are all "top-down," in that the properties of the whole de ne the individual. Thus, if one is interested in whether some lower-level entities (e.g., organisms) are parts of a higherlevel individual (e.g., species), one must ask questions about the emergent properties of the whole. Although top-down approaches to individuality have a strong history in philosophy, I prefer not to pursue them here, primarily because they are abstract and do not allow one to provide a one-sentence definition of individuality (Ghiselin, 1997) .
Here, I advocate a "bottom-up" criterion of individuation, wherein the connections among the parts determine the boundaries of the whole. This approach resembles treatments of species as classes whose membership is determined by the relations that the members have to each other (Hull, 1977; Kitcher, 1984) . It also resembles Mishler and Brandon's (1987) The most obvious category of connections that could serve to individuate entities are causal interactions. For example, the atoms of a solid object are connected by relatively strong bonds, meaning that they have an enhanced probability of sharing kinetic energy. As a result, imparting a force to a few atoms of the object is likely to result in all the atoms moving as a unit. Individuals arising from causal connections play an important role in science because they have implications for the future con gurations that are likely and unlikely to transpire. Such causal integration among parts has been suggested to be suf cient (but not necessary) for individuation (Ghiselin, 1997) .
Under the view of individuality advocated here, a second category of connection can also serve as an individuative criterion: Parts may be connected by a common history. For example, the Universe is an individual, not because all of its constituent atoms have any potential to interact (given their Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sysbio/article-abstract/47/4/641/1654746/Individuality-and-the-Existence-of-Spec by guest on 16 September 2017 rapid movement away from each other), but because its parts are all believed to share a common starting point at the Big Bang. Individuals arising from historical connections are important for science because they play a role in describing and explaining what has already happened.
Some have argued that entities united by common history that lack causal interactions should be treated, not as individuals, but as historical entities (Wiley, 1980) . However, since historical entities have similar properties to individuals (narrow sense), I follow Ghiselin (1997) in treating them as simply one type of individual (broad sense).
Although the bottom-up de nition of individuality is novel, it should have implications similar to those of top-down criteria. For example, how could a whole have an emergent property such as concreteness without there being some integration among its parts? The bottom-up approach assumes that a whole is no more than the sum of its parts plus the interactions among those parts. Therefore, unless one denies that all properties of a whole can be understood in terms of the properties and interactions of its parts, the bottom-up and top-down approaches should converge. Consequently, I contend that whatever implications we may nd by using the bottom-up approach, they are unlikely to be peculiar to this approach but would persist under any precisely dened criterion of individuality.
NATURAL KINDS OF SPECIES
The concept of natural kind is variously de ned in philosophy. Here, I de ne it as a class of individuals, each of which has the same kind of parts individuated by the same type of connection. Thus, a natural kind of species is a class that contains all individual species that are integrated by a particular kind of connection. To illustrate these relations I will describe two natural kinds of species, one individuated by causal connections, the other by historical connections. My main aim is not to promote these two natural kinds-since there are other natural kinds that could lay claim to the label "species" (Ereshefsky 1992b ; Shaw, 1998)-but use of these two concepts will help illustrate some implications of the bottom-up version of individuality for the species problem.
The rst natural kind is composed of interbreeding species, which I de ne as groups of organisms that have the potential to interbreed with one another but lack the potential to interbreed with organisms outside the group. Interbreeding refers not just to mating in this generation, but also to the potential to share a common descendant in some future generation. This de nition of interbreeding species has similarities to the biological species concept of Mayr (1942 Mayr ( , 1957 Mayr ( , 1963 and its conceptual cousins (e.g., Dobzhansky, 1950; Carson, 1957; Ghiselin, 1974; Paterson, 1985) , thanks to its emphasis on interbreeding. However, the present definition deviates from most of these in that it does not matter whether a lack of interbreeding is due to an intrinsic isolating mechanism or just to geography. The interbreeding species de nition is also quite similar to the evolutionary concept of Simpson (1961) and Wiley (1978) , in that it emphasizes the fate of descendants of the organisms under consideration. Unlike those approaches, however, this de nition applies only to sexually reproducing organisms. The interbreeding species de nition is quite close to the view of species espoused by Frost and Kluge (1994) .
The second kind of species is composed of genealogical species: basal, exclusive groups of organisms (Baum and Shaw, 1995) . Exclusive applies to a group of organisms, each of which is more closely related to other members of the group than to any organisms outside the group (de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1990; Baum, 1992) . Basal means that genealogical species cannot contain any nested exclusive groups of organisms. The genealogical species de nition emphasizes historical relatedness, as do some other phylogenetic species concepts (e.g., Donoghue, 1985) , but is based on exclusivity rather than monophyly (Baum and Donoghue, 1995; Baum and Shaw, 1995) . The genealogical concept deviates markedly from phylogenetic species concepts that are based on character-distributions instead of history (e.g., Cracraft, 1983; Nixon and Wheeler, 1990; Davis and Nixon, 1992) . Interbreeding and genealogical species are each composed of mutually connected parts (organisms), meaning that they satisfy the criterion of individuality given above. Further, the biological properties invoked (interbreeding and genealogical relatedness) almost certainly apply to some groups of organisms, meaning that the two natural kinds include some, probably many, actual entities.
THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIES INDIVIDUALS
THROUGH TIME
Philosophical Perspectives
We seem able to slip effortlessly from thinking of species as being time-limited entities made up of contemporaneous organisms into thinking of them as time-extended lineages. That we make such an adjustment so effortlessly probably tells us something about the way we perceive everyday individuals. Nonetheless, if we are going to pin down the implications of the species-asindividuals thesis, such imprecision is unacceptable.
The starting point for this discussion is the book Sameness and Substance, by philosopher David Wiggins (1980) , which builds a coherent approach to the temporal persistence of individuals. Wiggins's thesis of the sortal dependency of individuation holds that each individual is a member of some natural kind, perhaps a tree, a person, or a species. This claim means that throughout the existence of a time-extended individual, there must be a natural kind, of which the individual is an extension. This insight allowed Wiggins (1980:59) to show that a given individual must be an extension of the same natural kind at all times during which it exists. Hence, a time-extended individual can exist only so long as it is an extension of a particular natural kind.
Wiggins's analysis means that a criterion of individuation, i.e., the connection that serves to make an individual an extension of a particular natural kind (e.g., interbreeding), de nes the edges of a time-limited (synchronic) individual. The temporal continuity of a time-extended (diachronic) individual arises because the synchronic individuals join together to form time-extended "worms" (Fig. 1) . This temporal continuity rests on simple adjacency between successive synchronic individuals: As the time between adjacent slices approaches zero, the corresponding parts of successive synchronic individuals become continuous (see Armstrong, 1980 , for alternative treatments of temporal continuity). Hence, Wiggins showed that a synchronic criterion of individuation can do double-duty, serving to individuate both time-limited and timeextended individuals. Thus, the integration of individuals at one time, and the temporal continuity of individuals through time, can both be attributed to the connections among the parts of individuals at a moment of time.
A useful way of illustrating this perspective is to revisit the classical problem of Theseus's ship-a ship that is constantly being repaired such that eventually all the planks that originally made up the ship are replaced with new ones. In what sense is the ship with new planks the same as the original ship made, as it was, of entirely different lumber? The time-limited/time-extended dualism suggests that it is the same ship because between the two points in time there is an unbroken line of time-limited ships. On the other hand, if the planks that were gradually removed from said ship were used to make a new ship, that ship would not be Theseus's, because the planks awaiting construction of the new ship were at some time in between, not parts of any ship.
The relation between time-limited species and lineages. The left panel shows three slices of time separated by an arbitrary time interval, d t. In each slice, the organisms (black ovals) that share the speci ed connection are grouped into species (dark gray). As the time interval between slices approaches the limit of d t = 0, the time-limited species connect to form a timeextended lineage (right panel). 
Application to Species
The potential to interbreed and the degree of genealogical relatedness serve as the individuative criteria for interbreeding and genealogical species, respectively. Note that potential to interbreed and degree of genealogical relatedness are properties of the organisms living at an instant of time and do not require the passage of time to apply. They therefore serve to delimit synchronic slices that connect through time to form time-extended, diachronic individuals, hereinafter called lineages (Simpson, 1961) . Since synchronic criteria of individuation serve to set the edges of lineages in each slice of time, a timelimited de nition of species determines the content of a lineage. Therefore, because interbreeding species and genealogical species have different criteria of individuation, they each correspond to distinct lineages. Interbreeding species form interbreeding lineages, whereas genealogical species form genealogical lineages. Thus, pluralism (see below) at the level of synchronic species definitions translates directly into pluralism at the level of lineages. Moreover, given that a phylogenetic tree is no more than a collection of connected lineages, it too is subject to pluralism. Thus, as described by Maddison (1997) , the idea that there is some single "species-tree" that systematists aim to discover is oversimpli ed. Rather, we can consider a distinct kind of species tree for each distinct kind of species individual.
One way to counter the claim of lineage pluralism would be to argue that my notion of lineage is wrong, that a lineage is not built up from instantaneous slices, but rather is something whose primary mode of existence is through time. Thus, one could argue, a lineage is a strand of the genealogical nexus that maintains independence from other strands (e.g., Hennig, 1966; Wiley, 1980) . This viewpoint certainly is appealing but it is also vague. What exactly is "independence?" If "independent" is seen as the converse of "connected," then I would suggest that this view of a lineage resembles the one described above. That is to say, for a particular type of connection, a lineage is composed of organisms that are connected to each other but are not connected to those in other lineages. It is dif cult for me to see, therefore, how any precisely de ned notion of a lineage could avoid being built up of instantaneous synchronic individuals. Thus, if species pluralism is accepted (see below), lineage pluralism would seem to be inescapable.
Species Birth and Death
For regular individuals such as solid objects, a particular entity comes into existence at the rst point in time when a cluster of parts satis es the particular criterion of individuation (Fig. 2a) . That is, a timeextended individual begins when a timelimited individual does not connect to one in the previous time slice (see Chisholm, 1980 , for further discussion). Symmetrically, a time-extended individual ends at a point in time when a time-limited individual does not connect to an individual in the next time slice (Fig. 2b) . However, when an individual branches or fuses with another individual, for example, when a genealogical species at one point in time is connected to two or more genealogical species in some other time slice, these criteria fail (Fig. 2c) . The two genealogical species that arise from a lineage-splitting event are both connected to a genealogical species in the previous time slice, and thus neither was born. Likewise, the genealogical species before the split is connected to genealogical species after the split and, therefore, cannot be said to have ended. We would therefore have to conclude that a lineage-splitting event involves neither species birth nor death. So we have a paradox: No individual is born at a splitting event, and yet where we previously recognized one individual, we now have two.
One solution to this problem is to avoid it; to equate species with synchronic individuals, limiting species to single slices of time (Baum and Shaw, 1995) . This approach means that every slice of time would have a distinct taxonomy, and there would be no nomenclatural connection between these taxonomies. This approach avoids the paradox, but it ies in the face of many years of tradition, which states that species persist through time, e.g., that an Eocene Ginkgo fossil can be placed in the same species as the extant organisms named G. biloba. Thus, the time-limited view would probably disrupt current taxonomic conventions and would undermine any simplistic analogy we might wish to draw between speciesindividuals and "regular" individuals that persist through time.
The only way to maintain time-extended species that are born and die would be to identify criteria besides diachronic discontinuity for subdividing branching lineages. The most popular approach is to use cladogenesis as a death/birth point (e.g., Hennig, 1966; Willmann, 1986; Ridley, 1989) . Kornet (1993) modi ed this approach slightly by asserting that lineage-branching events should be permanent to mark the origin of a species. However, while this strategy is intuitively attractive, and has been advocated for the analogous case of organismic "birth" by ssion of a parent (Wiggins, 1980; Ghiselin, 1997) , it needs further justi cation.
The arguments given in favor of the cladogenesis criterion boil down to the assertion that species are lineages and that, therefore, lineage splitting should be equated with species birth. However, this argument does not show that species origin via lineage branching is in any way comparable to the origin of a conventional individual. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 2 , there are fundamental differences between conventional events of birth and death and the splitting of a diachronic individual.
An alternative and better justi cation for the cladogenesis criterion might be the claim that evolutionary biologists have some special needs to talk about lineages and branching events, and that equating time-extended species with internodes facilitates such intercourse. While this is a reasonable point, one should remember that evolutionary biologists also have diverse needs, such that the cladogenesis criterion might not be universally favored. For example, Mayr (1982) has argued that in many or most cases of allopatric or peripatric speciation, a parent that persists past speciation should be distinguished from a newly formed daughter species. The criterion for distinguishing the parental line from the daughters rests on the idea that the daughter lineage undergoes more phenotypic change, perhaps due to a population bottleneck. An alternative approach is to dissociate species origin from lineage branching and instead view it as occurring during anagenesis when sufcient character evolution has taken place (e.g., Simpson, 1944) . This view has recently been given a cladistic makeover with the claim that species birth occurs whenever a Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sysbio/article-abstract/47/4/641/1654746/Individuality-and-the-Existence-of-Spec by guest on 16 September 2017 derived character goes to xation (Nixon and Wheeler, 1992) .
Despite its intuitive appeal, the speciesas-individuals thesis provides no basis for arguing that cladogenesis is privileged as a criterion for breaking time-extended phylogenies into species. Instead, the choice of how to mark the beginnings and ends of species may have to be made operationally, based on what we consider to be the big question in speciation biology. If we think that cladogenesis is the main problem, then the lineage-branching approach could be favored. If, instead, we see a need to explain how phenomena such as bottlenecks shift the evolutionary dynamics of a population, then the view of Mayr (1982) might be preferred. Finally, if we believe that character evolution is the primary phenomenon of interest, then the approach of Nixon and Wheeler (1992) could be chosen.
In summary, a consideration of the existence of species individuals through time suggests, rst, that we need to come to terms with there being a plurality of lineages and, second, that the current dogma that species originate at splitting events needs to be reconsidered. These implications of species individuality have not been fully appreciated. In contrast, several other problematic implications of species individuality have been discussed before. Below, I revisit four such issues.
FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF SPECIES Pluralism
Species pluralism holds that there are several different kinds of species individual that may or may not be coextensive with each other (e.g., Holsinger, 1984; Kitcher, 1984; de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988; Ereshefsky, 1992b; Baum and Shaw, 1995; Shaw, 1998) . Under this viewpoint, a perceptual "species" made up of similar organisms may comprise the same organisms as a particular genealogical species and a particular interbreeding species, but this would not change the fact that there are two types of individual present. Therefore, an organism can be part of different species in different parallel taxonomies and, furthermore, conspeci cs in one parallel taxonomy need not be conspeci cs in a second taxonomy (Kitcher, 1984; de Queiroz and Donoghue, 1988; Ereshefsky, 1992b) . The contrasting view, species monism, holds that although different types of processes may contribute to the individuation of species, species share some deeper identity in common (e.g., Mishler and Donoghue, 1982; Mishler and Brandon, 1987) . Thus, monism holds that an organism exists as a member of at most one species and there is just one taxonomy of life.
The difference between monism and pluralism is much deeper than the semantic issue of whether the term "species" is reserved for one or multiple types of individual. Even if the term were attached to a single type of individual, that would not necessarily entail monism as described here. Pluralism would apply even if the term "species" was reserved for a particular natural kind of individual (e.g., genealogical species), provided there was also recognition of the other individuals (e.g., interbreeding individuals) that can contribute to an understanding of the origin and maintenance of biological diversity. Thus, the key issue is not the number of kinds of species admitted but whether we stress unitary perceptual individuals or the parallel individuation of groups of organisms by multiple biological processes.
Genealogical species and interbreeding species, as de ned above, will sometimes, but not always, be coextensive with each other. For example, a population dispersing to an island could instantly become a new interbreeding species if the likelihood of further migration between the populations is low enough. However, the two populations would remain conspeci c from the point of view of genealogical species. This, and other biological phenomena, mean that genealogical and interbreeding species will not always be coextensive. Therefore, to maintain monism, one would have to de ne "species" as the disjunctive set of individuals that are connected by interbreeding or genealogy, or both. This is, however, problematic. The resulting notion of species is not a natural kind, but an agglomeration of two overlapping natural kinds. This de nition would give the impression that a species individuated by interbreeding and one individuated by genealogy share some identity in common, which they do not. Furthermore, the decision as to the types of connections that may and may not individuate the disjunctive set, species, becomes arbitrary. Therefore, the species-as-individuals thesis would seem to strongly recommend pluralism over monism.
Fuzziness
The term fuzziness refers to the fact that the boundaries around entities are not sharp when lower-level entities (parts) are connected to only a subset of the other parts (Baum and Shaw, 1995) . For example, consider the de nition of the interbreeding species. Imagine that one member of a putative interbreeding species is more likely to interbreed with an organism that is outside the interbreeding species (as initially delimited) than with some small number of organisms that are inside (Fig. 3) . In such a situation, even with perfect knowledge of the actual breeding relations, it would be impossible to draw a sharp boundary such that every organism is de nitively in or out of the interbreeding species. A similar problem applies to genealogical species (Baum and Shaw, 1995) .
Since paradigmatic individuals such as organisms and solid objects do not manifest fuzziness, one might suggest that interbreeding and genealogical species are not individuals. Either I have missed some type of connection that can individuate clearcut species, or we need to reject speciesindividuality entirely. However, this argument is awed because all individuals, even solid objects, have fuzzy boundaries when observed suf ciently closely. We tend not to see fuzziness at some scales of observation needed, and our nervous system seems well able to imagine sharp edges even when they do not exist. Therefore, the fuzziness of species cannot be given as grounds for rejecting species-individuality.
From a practical point of view, it is hard to see that any great changes would be needed to taxonomic practice to accommodate species fuzziness. When a species is Bars linking organisms indicate that those organisms share the connection (e.g., potential to share a common descendant) required for membership in the natural kind of species. Organism a cannot be unambiguously placed within the species because it is connected to some but not all members of the species. A different manifestation of fuzziness is illustrated by the lack of a connection between organisms b and c. These two "types" of fuzziness are opposite ends of a continuum rather than distinct categories.
described, its exact limits need not be speci ed. Indeed, one need specify only one organism that is a part of the newly named species. Equally, it is common for specimens to be left without an unambiguous species determination. However, while this practice need not change, the interpretation ought to. Whereas previously uncertainty could be taken as re ecting the limitations of the taxonomist, this perspective suggests that fuzziness arises because the world is not fully cooperative with attempts to force order upon it.
Ranking
The de nitions of interbreeding species and genealogical species given above contain two components. The grouping criterion (Donoghue, 1985) is a statement of the basis for the grouping of organisms into individuals (connectedness via interbreeding or genealogy). The ranking criterion (Donoghue, 1985) serves to identify which one in a nested series of similar types of individuals should be called the species. In the case of interbreeding species, the requirement for complete reproductive isolation between interbreeding species is the ranking criterion and serves to restrict the term interbreeding species to the most inclusive interbreeding groups. In the case of genealogical species, the requirement that species be basal genealogical groups limits the term genealogical species to the least inclusive genealogical groups (Baum and Shaw, 1995) .
Ranking is, in a sense, arbitrary. If our aim is to understand what individuals exist in the world, then the claim that some of a nested series of individuals are more important than others is questionable. All individuals in the hierarchy arise because of the same type of connection and can be judged inherently equal in terms of what they tell us about the world. Hence, one could argue that we do not need ranking criteria (Mishler, in press). Either we could do away with the species rank or we could allow species to be nested within other species. The main argument for continuing to worry about the species rank is that the largest or smallest of a nested series may have special importance for no other reason than that it is at one extreme of a series. Thus, interbreeding species might play a special role in evolutionary biology because they mark the extreme edge of possible gene ow, the broadest eld for gene recombination (Carson, 1957) . Likewise, genealogical species may play a special role as the lowermost historical group, marking the boundary between reticulate and divergent genealogy (Baum and Shaw, 1995) . Therefore, that we should maintain ranking criteria appears preferable, if only to focus our attention on questions of biological interest, such as the mechanisms that serve to limit gene ow and that lead to the breaking of genealogical connections between isolated lineages. Be that as it may, we should not forget that if interbreeding and genealogical species are individuals, then so too are local demes and larger clades.
The ranking criteria used for interbreeding species and genealogical species happen to be such that species may reside at a hierarchical level above that traditionally associated with species. For example, recall that the ranking criterion given for interbreeding species was the most inclusive interbreeding group. This means that there is zero potential that organisms of one species will share descendants with any organisms outside the species. Zero is a concept that rarely holds in biology. For example, while it is extremely unlikely, we cannot rule out that humans and chimpanzees might share a common descendant in the distant future. A similar issue to genealogical species (e.g., Maddison, 1995; Doyle, 1995) . Thus, under the particular species de nitions I provided above, species individuals Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sysbio/article-abstract/47/4/641/1654746/Individuality-and-the-Existence-of-Spec by guest on 16 September 2017 might sometimes be larger groups than have traditionally been ascribed species status.
Unaf liated Organisms
A further implication of treating species as individuals, and especially the perceived need to identify the rank of species, is that some organisms will not be parts of any species. Or, put another way, some species will contain only one organism (Ghiselin, 1997) . This follows because there is no reason to think that every lower-level entity will be part of an individual of a given natural kind. Not every atom is in a molecule, not every molecule is in a solid object. This point would be too trivial to mention were it not for the fact that all organisms are traditionally assigned to species. Organisms that have entirely lost sexual reproduction would not be parts of any interbreeding species. Similarly, whereas all organisms will be part of at least one genealogical individual, they may not be parts of any basal genealogical group (Baum and Shaw, 1995) .
Biologists have been uncomfortable with the idea of leaving any organisms unassigned to species. It has been suggested that organisms that cannot be assigned to any species be placed in metaspecies (Donoghue, 1985; Mishler and Brandon, 1987) . This term was later co-opted to refer to groups of organisms that are not members of any genealogical species (Baum and Shaw, 1995; but see Graybeal, 1995) . However, while this convention has the advantage that it allows every organism to be assigned a binomial, it tends to hide the fact that metaspecies are not individuals. Therefore, naming metaspecies will tend to result in their being erroneously imbued with the attributes of individuals (Frost and Kluge, 1994) .
A rank-free system of phylogenetic taxonomy Gauthier, 1990, 1992; Graybeal, 1995) allows the possibility of a superior means to handle the lack of exhaustive subdivision in genealogical relationships. Under such a taxonomic system, organisms that cannot be assigned to a genealogical species would simply be indicated by reference to the least inclusive taxon of which they are a member, with some sufx to indicate that they are not members of any of the nested taxa therein. This constitutes a much more accurate description of the biological reality than is afforded by the metaspecies convention, yet maintains the ability to attach a meaningful name to every organism.
FROM ONTOLOGY TO EPISTEMOLOGY
Having talked extensively about species ontology, some brief discussion of epistemology is warranted. If we were interested in one natural kind of species, how would we go about discovering the particular individuals that are the extension of that natural kind? We would, of course, make observations of the biology of groups of organisms that, on the basis of our background theories, bear on the question of whether those organisms are integrated by the type of connection that is de ning for a kind of species. For genealogical species these would include, but not be limited to, the analysis of genegenealogies (Avise and Ball, 1990; Baum and Shaw, 1995; Maddison, 1995) . For interbreeding species one would look at such things as mating barriers, vagility, ecological requirements, etc. At some level we will inevitably be guided by our ability to pick out clusters of similar organisms. However, the decision to recognize and name a species would be based on the evidence for and against the hypothesis that the organisms really are integrated as interbreeding or genealogical species.
This sketch of the process of species discovery is hardly controversial. However, it does represent a subtle but radical shift from traditional views of species. The species that occupy systems of classi cation are not species individuals per se but species hypotheses (Baum and Shaw, 1995) . Even when a cluster of organisms comes to be perceived as being unquestionably a genealogical or interbreeding species, that does not mean it actually is one. We can never prove the existence of a species with certainty, just as we can never prove that the earth is round.
The view of species (and other taxa) as hypotheses rather than "things" may be disconcerting. In the quest for a systematics of real entities, we seem to have hit upon a systematics of ghosts. Could it be that giving so much priority to ontology has created a version of systematics that is epistemologically empty? After all, taxonomy can proceed on an epistemological level (and usually has) without any claims being made about the ontology of species.
While I am sympathetic to the frustration that arises from our inability to directly observe individuals, I do not see a valid alternative. A purely epistemological framework would have to depend upon operationalistic de nitions of species that explicitly or implicitly assume species to be no more and no less than the taxa recognized by humans (Hull, 1968; Baum and Donoghue, 1995) . Although this offers us repeatable (some would say "objective") ways to discover species, we are denied a clear sense of what has been discovered (Baum and Donoghue, 1995) . To be able to say something about the independent existence of species in general seems better, even if it means that we cannot point at a percept and know for sure that it corresponds to a real individual.
Although the objective of having our classi cations occupied by well-corroborated species hypotheses provides a clear and worthy challenge, it is likely to be unattainable within the current Linnaean system. Quite apart from the limitations on nancial and human resources, issues such as fuzziness, pluralism, and metaspecies mean that we cannot hope to achieve a tidy, exhaustive classi cation of life within the current taxonomic structure. Therefore, we need new conventions that allow one to clearly present one's hypotheses without presupposing a particular kind of pattern. The ongoing efforts to reinvent taxonomic structures within a phylogenetic framework should, therefore, give due thought to the patterns of interbreeding, relatedness, etc., that one might want to be able to communicate by using named individuals at or close to the species level.
CONCLUSIONS: THE REALITY OF SPECIES
The species-as-individuals thesis, when combined with the bottom-up view of individuation, leads to a number of unconventional implications for the ontology of species. First, it implies ontological pluralism, the idea that for each type of connection among organisms, a different type of species individual and corresponding lineage may exist in parallel. These distinct types of species need not be coextensive (i.e., contain the same set of organisms) and, even when they are, they still are not the same individual. Second, species (like other individuals) will lack sharp boundaries, making it impossible to always place an organism inside or outside a given species. Third, we either must accept species nested within each other or we should equate species with the most or least inclusive individual in a nested series. Fourth, not all organisms will be in any species. Fifth, the particular species named by systematists are best viewed as hypotheses of real individuals. All told, applying individuality to species should result in profound changes to the way systematists think about species and should produce substantial changes to taxonomic conventions.
Well-established conventions and thought processes should not be overturned on a whim. However, after three decades of consideration, it is about time that systematists came to terms with all the unsettling implications of the species-as-individuals thesis. Yes, we could face much internal con ict in deciding what natural kinds of species are worth recognizing and how taxonomicpractice should be changed. We would have to work hard to educate nonsystematist users of classi cations. However, the advantages of treating species as individuals are well worth these efforts. Without a claim of individuality, it is dif cult, if not impossible, to claim that species have independent existence. Without being able to assert the independent existence of species, one would have a hard time claiming that systematics is a worthwhile scienti c activity, and one could not hope to use the concept of species for broader evolutionary and ecological discourse.
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